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ABSTRACT
Duringthe 1930s and early 1940s U.S. Treasury bonds and notes had
negative nominal yields as they approached maturity. But since an investor
can always hold cash, this is impossible. Any bond must have a positive
nominal yield. This paper poses a resolution to this puzzle: in addition to
making coupon payments, Treasury securities were options that gave the
owner the right to buy a new security on a future date. The paper proposes
a method for valuing this 'exchange privilege' and computing the yield to
the coupon bearing component of these composite bond/options. Thecase
of the negative nominal interest rates demonstrates that the construction of
accurate data requires close examination of the institutional environment,
even when studying financial markets.
The corrected bond and note yields are used to calculate new estimates
of the term structure of interest rates from 1929 to 1949. Thesenew data
allow one to follow changes in the both the level and the shape of the yield
curve during the Great Depression.
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(614) 292-93391 Introduction
On December 31, 1932 the New York Times listed the yield on a 3%
United States Liberty Bond as -1.74%. This seems impossible. An investor
can always hold cash rather than an interest bearing security, so any bond
should have a positive nominal yield. It is well known that during the Great
Depression the prices of Treasury Bills at auction occasionally exceeded par.
But the negative yields were extremely small, on the order of .05%.1 Yields
of this small a magnitude can be explained by both the fact that Treasury
Bills were exempt from personal property taxes in some states {See Homer
(1976) pg. 355.] and that Treasury securities were required as collateral for
a bank to hold U.S. Government deposits.2 Negative nominal yields on the
order of -2% are an entirely different story. In fact, from mid-1932 through
mid-1942, the vast majority of coupon bearing U.S. Government securities
bore negative nominal yields as they neared maturity.3
Since negative nominal yields are impossible in a world where one can
always hold cash, these securities must have had other attributes that were
being valued. During the 1930s, the standard practice of the U. S. Treasury
was to issue new bonds with coupon rates that implied market prices above
par, but sell them at par. Holders of maturing bonds and notes were given
preferential treatment in the distribution of the new issue. Coupon bearing
Treasury securities had what was called an 'exchange privilege'. At maturity,
they could be exchanged at par for a new issue. Government bonds and notes
were not just coupon securities; they were options as well. The option had
value that was included in the quoted price. As a bond approached maturity,
this premium caused the price to rise high enough that the computed yield
was negative.
The solution to the first puzzle, that of the negative nominal interest
rates, has given way to a second one: Why did the Treasury sell new issues
at prices below those prevailing in the market? The answer to this question
can be found by studying the institutional environment of the 1930s. Legal
in excess of par were received throughout 1939, 1940 and 1941. The highest
recorded was 100.018 on January 8, 1941. See the Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Treasury, 1941 pg. 301.
2jhavealso heard the claim that banks substituted Treasury Bills for smaller de-
nomination currency in making interbank transfers, and so the negative yield reflected
convenience. Unfortunately, this could not be substantiated.
3The plots in both Durand (1942) and the U.S. Treasury Bulletin for 1939 imply
negative nominal yields for maturities below two years. Childs (1947, pg. 259) also notes
the existence of negative nominal yields in the 1930's but provides no explanation.
1constraints forced the Treasury to sell new securities at par. To insure that
an offering actually sold, the coupon rate had tobe set above the current
market interest rate. Initial purchasers were paid to place the new issue.
This was the method of underwriting.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the conditions that led to the
apparent negative nominal interest rates and then usethis information to
construct accurate data on the returns to holding U.S. Government securi-
ties during the 1930s and 1940s. Proper computation of the term structure
during the 1930s requires careful examination of the institutionsof the bond
market and Treasury debt management. In what follows, a method for valu-
ing the exchange privilege is described and used to correctthe measurement
of the yields of traded securities. These are used to construct term structure
estimates from 1929 to 1949 that are consistent with those currently in use.
These new data replace the sketchy data contained in the Federal Reserve
Board's Banking and Monetary Statistics of the United States, and for the
first time allow one to follow changes in the shape of the term structure dur-
ing the Great Depression. The interest rate data can beadded to new data
on three and six month time loans in Mankiw and Miron (1985)and the
new output, production and unemployment data in Romer (1986a,1986b,
1986c and 1987).
The motivation for constructing this new data set is twofold. First,
empirical research in macroeconomics often relies on the use of lengthytime
series data.4 While Salomon Brothers publishes estimates of yields at 3
months, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 20 years to maturity beginning in 1950,data
on the term structure of interest rates prior to 1950 are noticeably missing.
Second, the resurgence of interest in the economics of the Great Depression6
makes it all the more important to exploit new data sources.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section II de-
scribes the raw data collected and used in the study. The following section
provides a detailed account of the Treasury practices thatcaused nominal
interest rates to be negative. The rationale for the Treasury's behavioris
also examined. A method for valuing the exchange provision is then pro-
4This is true of the original work on business cycle dating summari2ed in Moore and
Zarnowitz (1986) and the more recent studies of the effects of money by Friedman and
Schwartz (1982) and investment by Gordon and Veitch (1986).
Recently, McCulloch (1987) has estimated coupon corrected yield curves for December
1946 to February 1987 that will likely replace the Salomon data in future research.
6Papers by Bernanke (1983, 1986), Bernanke and Powell (1986), Field (1984), Hamilton
(1987) and the essays in Brunner (1981) are examples.
2posed and used to compute the yield to the coupon bearing component of
the composite bond/option. To allow the complete use of the information in
the data, it is necessary to study the tax status of existing securities. This
is the task of Section 4. The following section uses this tax information,
together with the corrected yields from Section 3, to construct estimates of
the term structure using a technique derived by Nelson and Seigel (1985).
The concluding section provides a comparison of the new interest rate series
with those previously available and finds that there are substantial differ-
ences. The adjustments for the exchange privilege lead to systematically
higher estimates of yields at maturities below five years.
2Data
Existingdata on nominal interest rates prior to World War II are both
limited in scope and imprecise. The Federal Reserve Board's Banking and
Monetary Statistics of the United States contains several series for interest
rates during the inter-war period, but it is dlifficult to tell exactly how the
numbers were constructed and to what securities they actually refer. For
example, Table No. 122 on page 460 of the Banking and Monetary Statistics
includes monthly series for '3- to 5-year tax exempt Treasury notes', while
Table No. 128 on page 468 reports longer term bond yields under the simple
heading 'U.S. Government'. The second of these refers to the unweighted
average of the yield on all outstanding bonds with at least twelve years to
maturity. Clearly, there is motivation for collecting a new and more complete
set of interest rate data.
Construction of a new data set on the term structure requires infor-
mation on the prices of outstanding Treasury issues. These raw data were
collected from the New York Times financial column entitled 'Bond Sales on
the New York Stock Exchange.' Quotes on the prices of all U.S. Treasury
Bonds, Notes and Certificates of Indebtedness were collected from the New
York Times for the final trading day of each month from January 1929 to
December 1949. The data set is complete in that it contains a yield for
every bond, note or certificate for every month during which it was in exis-
tence. It is composed of all 152 coupon bearing securities either in existence
in January 1929 or issued during the twenty-one year period examined, Of
this total, 56 are bonds, 54 are notes, and 42 are certificates of indebtedness.
In addition to coupon securities, beginning in mid-1931 data were col-
lected on the yield of Treasury Bifis with three months to maturity —prices
3are not reported.7 As is currently the case, TreasuryBills were pure discount
securities. Other Treasury Bills of shorter maturity were excluded sincethe
major objective is to study yields at longermaturities.8
As is nearly always the case in research on financial markets, the data
refer to dealer price quotes. There is no guarantee that actual transactions
occurred at these prices. This problem is minimized by computing yields
based on the mean of the bid/ask spread. But it is impossible to know how
large an error comes from systematic differences betweendealer quotes and
transactions prices.
It is possible, however, to insure that trading occurred. The New York
Times does report volume. For example, on January 30, 1932, volume in
the 3% Treasury Bonds of 1940-43 amounted to $130,000. While this is
a very small fraction of the nearly $360 millionof the issue outstanding, it
is important that there was some trading. To make the data set complete,
in several isolated cases it was necessary to use price quotes that did not
reflect trading on the New York Stock Exchange. These quotes werefound
in the New York Times under the heading 'U.S. Bond Quotations —Closing
quotations for issues not traded in on [sic] the Stock Exchange yesterday.'
Since the majority of U.S. Treasury bonds issued during this period con-
tamed call provisions, there is a problem in computing the yield to maturity.
Fortunately, except for several very special cases, all bonds werecalled on
the first allowable date. As such, all yields were computed to the calldate.9
The raw data consists of 9070 observations over 252 months, or just
under 36 observations per month, on average. These raw data are available
from the author on standard diskettes. As one would expect, the numberof
observations is small during the first few years, increasing substantially with
the debt issues of the middle 1930s and again with the issues duringWorld
7Childs (1947, pg. 432) describesearlyTreasury Bill issues. While the first Treasury
Bills were issued in 1929, it was not until 1931 that a series can be constructed that is
composed solely of issues with three months to maturity. During 1929 and 1930,bills
were issued at irregular intervals and matured in three, six, nine ortwelve months. Three
month Treasury Bill rates were found for February, April and May 1931, as well as every
month beginning with July 1931.
81n addition, all interest bearing government debt not issued directly by the U.S. Trea-
sury, such as securities issued by the Federal Home LoanBank Board or the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, is omitted.
alternative is to compute the yield to the call date when the price of the security
exceeds par, and the yield to the final maturity date when the price is below par.Use of
this rule would have virtually no effect on the results since bonds nearly alwayssold at
prices in excess of par.
4War II. In 1929, 1930 and 1931 there are anaverage of only 14 data points
per month. By 1933, the average is over 20, rising steady to 40 in 1939, to
54 in 1945 and falling to 38 in 1949. The implication is that the estimated
yield curves will be less accurate for the earlier period simply because of the
paucity of data.
3 Negative Nominal Yields and the
Exchange Privilege
Consider the following exercise. Take the data described in Section 2 for
a representative month and compute the yield to maturity for all the coupon
bearing securities based on the mean of the bid/ask spread. The results for
February 1935 are plotted in Figure 1.10 In the figure, N's refer to fully
tax exempt securities and P's refer to partially tax exempt securities. This
distinction is discussed further in Section 4. The solid line is an estimate of
a term structure using the techniques described in Section 5. (Following the
standard convention, all interest rates are in bond yield equivalents —two
times the six month rate.)
Figure 1 has several striking features. First, except for the single N
representing the 3 month Treasury Bill yield of .15%, the yield curve is
smoothly upward sloping, if one were to neglect the vertical scale, the
picture would not seem odd. The problem is that the lowest point is a
Treasury note with 5 months to expiration and a yield of -1.25%. if this
result were obtained for an isolated month, one would be inclined to check
the raw price data for errors. But negative yields arise consistently from
1932 through 1942.
Discussions of the period note the existence of negative nominal yields.
They point out that during the 1930s the standard practice of the U.S.
Treasury was to issue new bonds above par and give holders of maturing
bonds, notes and certificates preferential treatment in distributing the new
issue. Maturing securities had an 'exchange privilege' which gave them
added value.
The remainder of this section is divided into two parts. The first pro-
vides a discussion of the institutional environment that led to the apparent
negative nominal yields and discusses the reason for the Treasury to issue
10A similar diagram was constructed for every month of the data set. From 1934 to
1941 all of the figures had the same general features as Figure 1.
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5
 securities in the way that it did. This is followed by a detaileddescription
of how to correct the data for the existence of the exchangeprivilege.
3.1 The Exchange Privilege
Each year, the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury describes
the offerings of securities during thatyear. In the 1930s, new offerings
were announced from one to two weeks prior to the date of issue. The
announcement stipulated the method of payment. The purchaser was either
required to pay cash, required to exchange an existing security (valued at
par), or given a choice of the two. Of the 86 new and additional offerings of
bonds, notes and certificates of indebtedness from 1932 to 1940, 15 required
cash payment, 31 could be obtained only by exchange, and theremaining
40 gave the purchaser a choice.11
For reasons that wifi be discussed below, the Treasury'sregular practice
was to fix the coupon rate on a new issue above the current interest rate
for a bond of equivalent maturity, causing the initial price of thenew bond
in the securities market to exceed par. Exchange allowed the holder ofa
maturing security to reap the benefit of this, giving value to the exchange
privilege.12 Of the 57 coupon bearing securities that matured between 1932
and 1940, 54 could be exchanged at maturity for new issues thatinitially
sold in excess of par.
Cash payment was by subscription. Prospective purchasers madeappli-
cation for a certain amount of the issue and sent either 5% or 10% (depending
on the issue) of the face value as a deposit. Subscription was guaranteedup
to some level, usually $5,000 or $10,000. Individuals' requests in excess of
the minimum were filled as a percentage of the total of all applications. For
example, subcribers to the 1949-52bond, whose issue was announced
on December 3, 1934, were alloted 18% of the amount they requested, but
not less than $10,000.. Between 1932 and 1940, cash subscribers, onaverage,
were alloted 15.4% of their requests, but not less than $5263.
Once the allotment was determined, a cash subscriber could take deliv-
ery by paying the remaining balance. For example, a request for $100,000
'1The total of 86 issues exceeds the actual number of new securities by 19 because of
the practice of making additional offerings of aireading existing securities.
'2Durand (1942) mentions the exchange privilege, but implies that its value is derived
from the saving in brokerage fees that comes from rolling over an investment. It is difficult
to see why someone wishing a long term security would buy a maturing one simply for the
benefit of having it roll over. Theis (1985) in replicating the work of Durand also notes
the existence of the exchange privilege and correctly points out the source of its value.
7might require a $10,000 deposit. lithe final allotment were 18%,then upon
delivery the subscriber must pay the balance of $8,000. Becausethe bonds
were issued above par, a cash subscriber could make a profit by seffingthem
immediately. In the case of the 3% 1949-52 bond, the bid price onDe-
cember 15, 1934 was 101w, implying a profit of 1. Alternatively, since
the offering announcement guaranteed a minimum allotment, in this case
$10,000, a subscriber could sell the securities to a dealer on awhen-issued
basis. In this second case, the investor would take delivery of the bondsand
immediately hand them over to the dealer, retaining the difference between
par and the when-issued price that was previouslyagreed upon.13
Neither of the strategies associated with cash subscription was without
risk. Since the market price of the bond on the issue date was uncertain at
the time of subscription, there is clear risk in actually taking deliveryand
then selling the bonds on the open market. Since the allotment was not
guaranteed, an investor had no way of knowing the quantitythat would be
delivered and could not safely sell more than the guaranteed amount on a
when-issued basis. Exchange, on the other hand, was less risky since the
amount of the new issue received was always guaranteed.
At this point, it is useful to compute the realized values of both the ex-
change privilege and the profit from cash subscription. The profitfrom cash
subscription is easily determined by collecting data on the first quoted price
of a new issue and taking the difference from par. In order to value the ex-
change privilege, information in the Treasury's offering notices, reprintedin
the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, was used to matcheach
maturing note and bond, beginning with the 2% Treasury note maturing on
March 15, 1932, with the new issues for which it could be exchanged.Then
the value of each new security on its issue date was determined by usingthe
closing quotation from the New York Times on thatdate.14 The realized
value of the exchange privilege is the difference between the first bid priceof
the new issue and par. When a security could be exchanged for morethan
one new one, the value was assumed to be thatof the most lucrative trade
13Porter (1938,1939) calls this a 'free-ride' and describes in detail how to make a quick
profit in the week preceding the new issue. She suggested subscribing,and selling the
guaranteed amount, then only $1000, on a when-issued basis. According to aBell's account
in the December 11, 1938 New York Times, Porter's article in the December1938 issue
of Scribner's Magazine set off a rush of subscriptions during that month andcaused the
Treasury to reduce the guaranteed amount.
'41n several cases, no quote was found in the newspaper. For bonds, the first available
quotation reported by Childs was substituted. For notes, the firstavailable quote was
located in the New York Times.
8available. Obviously, the realized value was always nonnegative.
To illustrate the procedure, take an example. The 2% Note issuedon
January 29, 1934 and maturing on March 15, 1935 could be exchanged for
a 1% Note maturing on March 15, 1940. The March 16, 1935 New York
Times reported the first bid on the new issue as 101k,1.16%above par.
Between 1932 and 1940, the average value of the exchange privilegere-
alized by holder of maturing coupon secruities was 1.1% with a standard
deviation of .67%. Cash subscribers realized anaverage profit of .68% with
a standard deviation of .51%.
It appears that the mechanism used to issue and refund Treasury debt
involved giving away substantial amounts money. But closer examination of
both the legal and economic environment of the 1930s leads to an explana-
nation of the Treasury's behavior. From the end of 1929 to the end of 1939
the interest bearing debt of the U.S. Government more than doubled, rising
from $16 biffion to $41 biffion. Prior to the Depression, major buildups of
government debt had only occured during wartime and the severe Depres-
sions of the 19th century. As such, the Treasury had no real mechanism
for issuing debt. The network of dealers and banks that serve to distribute
newly issued securities today was not yet in place.
Current law also constrained Treasury actions. The Second Liberty Bond
Act, which gave authority for the issuance of Treasury debt, required that
new Treasury Bonds and Certificates of Indebtedness be issued at par,and
new Notes issued at not less than par.'5 Given this statute, the only way to
guarantee that a new issue would be sold (or maturing securities presented
for exchange), was to set the coupon rate on the new bond or note above
the current market interest rate on a comparable security.16
As is mentioned above, participation in either subscription or exchange
entailed risks, and so some sort of compensation was in order. With a
potential exchange, there was no way of knowing what the value would
be until the full transaction was complete. The characteristics of the new
security were announced only a few weeks prior to maturity of the existing
bond or note. For subscribers, there was the uncertainty about the size
of the allotment and the movement of interest rates over the week prior
to the physical delivery of the securities. The compensation for this risk is
analogous to the fee paid to underwriters of corporate securities who commit
15See U.S. Department of Treasury (1938).
16Perhaps surprisingly, auctions of coupon securities by the U.S. Treasury didnotbegin
until 1970. Treasury Bills, on the other had, have been auctioned since their inception in
1929.
9themselves to selling a fixed quantity of a stock or bond at a given price on
a future date, thereby assuming the risk inherent in pricefluctuations.
Two pieces of evidence support the view that the exchange privilege
and the profit to cash subscription were underwriting spreads. First, the
magnitude of the differential is appropriate. Cohan (1961), inhis study of
the cost of floating private debt in the 1930s, concludes that gross under-
writing spreads for offerings of Aaa public utility bondsbetween 1935 and
1940 ranged from 1.65% to 2.01%. The discrepancy between thisand the
approprixmately 1% compensation for underwriting Treasury issuesis easily
explained by differences in risk.'7
Additional evidence comes from looking at the identity of the initial
purchasers of the Treasury's new offerings. During the 1930s,individuals in
the Second Federal Reserve District, New York, were alloted over 50%of all
new securities (either on subscription or exchange).It is natural to conclude
that the banks and dealers in New York City, who dominate thisFederal
Reserve District, were being paid a fee to insure placement of thebonds.'8
The impact of the legal constraints is also easy to demonstrate. Again,
take the example of the 1 % Note issued on March 15, 1935 and maturing
5 years later. As has already been noted, on March 16, 1935 thefirst bid for
the new issue was 101k. This implies a yield to maturity of 1.38%. During
this period, there seems to have been a convention that all coupon rates were
quoted in even ths.'9 While the Treasury could have setthe coupon rate
at 1% and still sold the issue —theinitial price would have been approx-
imately 1O0 —thismay not have been viewed as sufficient compensation
for potential underwriters (brokers or individuals) to be willing to accept
the risk associated with subscribing to this new issue.
Contemporary beliefs, as expressed in January 2, 1939 issueof Barron's,
support this view. An article entitled 'Valuingof "Rights" in Treasury
Notes' states, in part:
17The fact that issues were heavily oversubscribed suggests that the payment offered by
the government exceeded the market clearing underwriting fee. But since everyoneknew
how the subscription procedure worked, there must have been substantial gaminginvolved
in determining the subscription amounts. In fact, if every subscriber was indifferentabout
being ailoted an additional bonds, the ratio of requests to allotmentscould have become
arbitrarily large.
18This is similar to the underwriting mechanism of the 1950s described in Bloch (1963).
Then, banks were allowed to buy new issues by simply crediting the Treasury'stax and
loan account at that bank.
'9The first coupon security that did not have a coupon rate that was a multiple of .
wasa 0.90% Note issued on December 1, 1944.
10At the present time, the Treasury is faced with the prospect
of having to borrow substantial amounts of newmoney for some
time to come. In addition, there is a large volume of short-term
Treasury obligations that must be refunded during the next few
years. Under these circumstances, [Treasury] Secretary [Henry]
Morgenthau has apparently concluded that it is wise to make new
United States Treasury issues unusually attractive to investors.
3.2Computingthe Corrected Yields
An estimate of the market value of the exchange privilege substantially
prior to the maturity of a security is needed to correct the data for the value
of the exchange privilege.20 The effect of the exchange privilege is to raise
the price of a bond above what it otherwise would be. An interpretation
of this is that securities were trading as if their face value exceeded 100 by
a 'bonus' representing the value of the exchange privilege. Once the bonus
is estimated, the yield to the coupon bearing component of the composite
security can be computed.
The realized value of the exchange privilege —computedby assuming
that an investor holds a bond to maturity, makes the exchange and sells
the new security on the day of issue —isof no use. As is clear from the
previous discussion, the realized value is a biased estimate of the market's
expectation, since it includes an underwriting spread. Fortunately, an arbi-
trage condition can be used to value the exchange privilege and correct the
yield estimates.
All coupon bearing securities in the sample made payments at six month
intervals. This means that all notes, bonds and certificates with less than
six months to maturity were pure discount securities.21 Beginning in June
of 1931, the Government regularly issued three month Treasury Bifis. Arbi-
trage implies that the yield on a note with less than six months to maturity
and a bill maturing on the same day must be the same. This provides a
simple way of calculating the market (or implied) value of the exchange
privilege. Three months or less prior to maturity, each coupon bearing se-
curity can be matched with a Treasury Bifi maturing on the same day. The
implied value of the exchange privilege is the difference between the traded
20The same article in Barron'squotedabove contains subjective estimates of the value
of the exchange privilege that differ by small amounts from those computed here.
The fact that interest on coupon bearing securities accrues linearly introduces a small
error that is imperceptible at low interest rates.
11price of the security and the price implied by the Treasury Bill rate, appro-
priately discounted.22
To see how the computation is done, define P as the price quoted in the
newspaper for a bond nearing maturity. An individual purchasingthe bond
must pay this price, plus accrued interest. Interest on government securities
accrues linearly between coupon payments. Assume the bond pays a coupon
SC per year, or $C every six months, and has rn years to maturity. Since
m is less than year (the bond has less than six months to maturity), the
last coupon payment was (— m)years ago, and the accrued interest is
—m).The price with accrued interest is just F' =P+ -(— m).
Arbitrage requires that the yield to holding this security equal the yield to
holding a Treasury Bill maturity in m years, call this T.Theimplied value of
the exchange privilege (Pre), is calculated from the arbitrage relationship:23
1100+C+Pre. (1)
(1 + r)m
The computation is very simple. Take the example of the 2% note
maturing on March 15, 1935. On December 30, 1934, with two and one-half
months to maturity, the closing quotation for the mean of the bid/ask spread
was 101.19, so the actual price with accrued interest was 101.19+2.5(g)
101.92. if calculated naively, this implies a nominal yield to maturity of
—3.28% at an annual rate. On the same date, the Treasury Bifis maturing on
both March 7andMarch 21, 1934 yielded 0.20% bid, but no ask is reported.
Assuming a bid/ask spread of 's indicates a mean bid/ask spread yieldof
0.05%. The implied value of the exchange privilege is calculated as the face
value that is consistent with a price of 101.92 and a yield of 0.05%:
101.92=100+2+Pr. (2)
(1 + 0.0005)
For this case, the value of Pre is 0.68. The bond is trading as if its face
value were 100.68. As noted above, the bond could have been traded in for
a new security seffing for 101.16. So, while the realized value was 1.16,the
implied or market expected value was only 0.68.
22Thjsignoresthe tax distortions in the Treasury Bill data mentioned in the introduc-
tion, which are clearly small relative to the problem caused by the exchange privilege.
23Tax considerations do not effect this calculation, since both interest and capital gains
on government securities were tax-exempt prior to 1941. See Section 4.1for a partial
discussion.
12This procedure was employed for allcoupon securities maturing between
March 1932 and December 1944.24 All of the estimatesare based on the
mean of the bid and ask price and maturity dates that match within three
days. When an ask price was not available, one was computed from the bid
assuming a bid/ask spread of 25 (It is worth noting that marking the
coupon security to the Treasury Bill rate makes the information in the note
or bond yield redundant. As such, the yield curves estimated in Section 5
do not utilize the coupon security yields at shortmaturities.)
A simple univariate regression can be used to summarize the relation-
ship between the realized and the market expected value of the exchange
premium. Assuming that the realized premium (Pr) equals the expected
premium (Pre) plus an orthogonal error, the appropriate regression is
Pr(i) .461 + 1.032 Pre(i)
(.161) (.216)
(Numbers in parentheses are standard errors)
—2 Mean of Pr =1.036Number of Observations =65R.25
As anticipated, the market implied premium is correlated with the realized
value, but systematically underestimates it.26 The evidence supports the
hypothesis that the value of the exchange privilege was related to its function
as an underwriting fee.
Once the implied market value of the exchange privilege is determined
for every relevant coupon security, the yields can be recomputed. For each
security, Pre(i) is assumed to be an increment to the face value. The yield
is recomputed for the entire lifetime of the note or bond assuming that the
face value is [100 + Pre(i)], not the usual 100. For example, in thecase of
24Whjle the practice of allowing payment by exchange continued beyond1944, the
terms were no longer as favorable. Allotment was not guarantee, and so the value of the
'privilege' disappeared.
25The results are not sensitive to the use of either the bid or ask in place of themidpoint of the spread —theestimated values of the exchange privilege change by less than 0.0001.
26The comparison assumes that an individual cashes in the new securityon the day it
is issued. Prior to December of 1940, the capital gain from the sale of a note or certificate
of deposit was nontaxable. If, however, the premium were taxable as a short term capital
gain, this would provide another explanation for the difference between the realized and
implied values in equation (3). For reasons that are described in the Section 4, it is only
beginning in 1941 that the tax effects could have been significant. Examination of the data
shows that therelationshipbetween the realized and implied premium has no systematic
difference over the two periods.
13the 2% Note described above, the yield for everymonth from January 1934
to February 1935 was recomputed assumingthe face value was 100.68.27
Adopting this procedure entails making a very strong,but unavoidable
assumption. For the entire lifetime of a bond,market participants are as-
sumed to perfectly anticipate what the value of the exchangeprivilege will
be when the security reaches three months to maturity.Since the prices
of all government securities, except for Treasury Bills, weresubject to the
distortions of the exchange privilege, there is noother way of determining
the implicit value of the coupon bearing componentof a bond or note at
any time other than when its maturityis less than three months. Since no
other data are available, there is no other way to proceed.28
Figure 2 plots the estimated yieldscorrected for the value of the ex-
change privilege for February of 1935. Again,P and N denote to differences
in tax treatment and the solid line is a term structure usingthe techniques
described in Section 5. For longer maturities, in excessof seven years or so,
the data are nearly identical to the uncorrected yields plottedin Figure 1.
But for the shorter maturities, below five years,the yields are now strictly
positive and smoothly upward sloping. Futhermore,the three month Trea-
sury Bill yield that is so much higherthan the remainder of the yield curve
in Figure 1 no longer stands out.
There is obviously more noise in the corrected datathan in the raw data
in Figure 1. Any plot of the yield to maturity againstthe time to maturity
for coupon securities will only produce a smooth pattern, evenin theory, if all
the coupon rates are the same. This explains why, even at longermaturities,
the figure reveals small vertical displacements. Matters areobviously worse
at the shorter maturities. While this may bedue to inaccuracies in the
quoted prices,29 some of the errors, are too largeto be accounted for by
anything but mismeasurement of the valueof the exchange privilege. For
2TThe fact that both the realized and the market expected value of exchange privilege
were always strictly greater than zero, suggeststhat the option was always in the money.
If this was the case, an options pricing model is not need to computethe decay in the
value of the exchange privilege going back in time. The market impliedvalue must decay
at the rate of interest implying that the method used is correct.
28J is possible to examine the fluctuation in the market value of the exchangeprivilege
associated with a given security. This is done by recomputingthe value of Pre for the
observations when the bond or note had less than three months tomaturity. The results
of this exercise show only small movements.
29 quotesare for the end of the day, but reflect informationand revision at different
times of the day. Because of the nonlinearity of the yield computation,price quotation
errors cause larger errors in yields at at shortermaturities.
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5
 example, on December 31, 1938 the corrected yield to maturity for the 2%
Note maturing on June 15, 1939 is estimated to be 1.025% (the uncorrected
yield is -2.13%). At the same time, the T-Bill maturing on March 29, 1934
yielded 0.05%. A data point like this one is clearly visible on a scatter plot.
The error is much to large to be the result of an error in a price quote
that is incorrect by several 32nd's. Mismeasurement of the value of the
exchange privilege is the clear source. It is important to keep in mind that
the shorter the time to maturity, the larger these errors become. As such,
in the following analysis all coupon bearing securities with maturity of less
than six months are omitted.
Errors and all, the corrections for the exchange privilege are extremely
important. They completely eliminate the existence of apparent negative
nominal interest rates on coupon bearing securities and allow computation
of yield curves for the 1930s.
4 Tax Considerations
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, securities with different tax status
coexisted. It is important, therefore, to take account of the tax treatment
of interest payments in determining how to use the information contained
in all of the data.
Changes in both individual and corporate taxes allow division of the 1929
to 1949 period into two distinct subperiods. The dividing point is January
1941. Prior to 1941, the interest income on nearly all U.S. Government
securities was either partially or wholly tax exempt.30 Beginning on March
1, 1941, all newly issued securities bore interest that was fullytaxable. The
interest on Treasury notes issued in December 1940 and January 1941 was
fully taxable as well.
The remainder of this section describes the details of the tax treatment of
interest payments to individuals and corporations during these two period.
The conclusion is that for the 1941 to 1949 period it is possible to conform
to the precedent set by the Salomon data and quote nominal interest rates
of fully taxable securities on a before tax basis. From 1929 to 1940 all the
interest on government debt was essentially exempt from taxation, and so
the yields measure alter tax returns.
30Several issues prior to June of 1930 bore interest that wasfullytaxable to individuals,
but wholly tax exempt for corporations. These will not be dealt with separately.
164.1 1929 to1940
For the majority of the first twelve years of the sample, ifiterest on Trea-
sury Bills, Notes and Certificates of Indebtness was completely exempt from
both personal and corporate taxes. Interest on Treasury bonds, however,
was partially tax exempt. The meaning of the partial tax exemption de-
pended on whether the bond was owned by an individual or a corporation.
It is important to consider both cases.
For individuals, the interest on the first $5000 face value of bonds held
was exempt from income tax. Any additional interest was taxable at the
'surtax' rate. During this period, the individual income tax was composed of
a 'normal' tax, which had at most two steps and a surtax that was graduated
with as many as 55 steps. Today, the personal income tax simply sums the
two. As has been the case in recent history, tax rates changed frequently.
For the bulk of the period, the normal tax rate was 4 percent. The surtax
rate ranged from 1% to 75% depending on income.31
For corporations, interest on all government obligations was fully tax
exempt prior to 1934. From 1934 to 1940, the interest on the face value in
excess of $5000 was taxable at the 'declared value excess profits' tax rate,
but was exempt from the normal corporate income tax. Income in excess of
a certain percentage of the book value of a corporation's capital stock was
subject to this tax. In 1934-35, the rate was 5% on profits in excess of 10%
of book value. From 1934 to 1940, this form of the excess profits tax rose to
6% on profits between 10% and 15% of the book value of the capital stock,
and equaled 12% of profits in excess of 15% of book value.
It is difficult to believe that the partial tax exemption had any value
to individuals holding Treasury Bonds since the majority of the owners of
the bonds almost certainly held amounts in excess of $5000. Interest they
received was, to a first approximation, fully taxable. For corporations, how-
ever, the tax exemption was very important.
The implication is that a proper comparison of partially and wholly
tax exempt bonds requires some inference about the identity of the owner
of the marginal bond. While it is impossible to determine the marginal
participant in the securities market, information on the average participant
can be gleaned from data on the ownership of the bonds and the interest
income on which taxes were paid.
Data from tax returns show that the vast majority of the securities were
owned by corporations. Individuals were required to report ownership of
31See Statistics of Income For 1950, Part 1, pg.319if. for data on the surtax.
17government debt. Tabulations of these returns in various issues of the Statis-
tics of Income show that only 10% of the outstanding debt was owned indi-
viduals. Corporations, on the other hand, reported holding in excess of half
of the debt.32
Data from corporate income tax returns allow examination of the tax
liability faced by corporations receiving interest payments from the U.S.
Treasury. These data show that the declared value excess profits tax paid
on interest was negligible. The marginal tax rate applicable to interest
income faced by corporations was on the order of %.
Theconclusion is that, between 1929 and 1940 partially tax exempt
securities can be treated as if they were wholly tax exempt. Corporations
owned the bulk of the securities and faced tax rates that were negligible.
This classification allows construction of estimates of the term structure of
nominal interest rates on tax exempt securities prior to World War II.
4.21941 to1949
Beginning in 1941, the interest on all newly issued Treasury securities
was treated as regular income to individuals and normal profits to corpora-
tions. For individuals, this did not represent a very large change, since the
partial tax exemption of the previous years had very little impact. But for
corporations, the tax status of these new issues made their yields substan-
tially different. Not only was the interest on the taxable securities subject
to the normal corporate profits tax and the declared value excess profits tax,
but it was also subject to a new excess profits tax and numerous surtaxes
during World War II.
To see the difference this made to a corporation, take 1941 as an example.
Interest paid on partially tax exempt bonds was subject to the declared value
added excess profits tax with a maximum rate that had risen to 13.2%, plus
a surtax with a maximum rate of 7%. By contrast, interest from fully
taxable securities was subject to both the normal corporate profits tax and
an additional excess profits tax. The normal profits tax rate was 24% for
corporations with net income in excess of $38,500 and an excess profits tax.
The new excess profits tax rates were very high. They began at 20% for
income less than $20,000 and increased to a maximum of 50% for income
in excess of $500,000. The highest tax rate on fully taxable interest income
32The remaining 40% is ale likely owned by entities that are neither domestic corpora-
tions nor individuals, i.e. foreigners, trusts and the government.
18was nearly 95%•33 This is substantially higher than the maximum rate of
20.2% on the interest from partially tax exempt bonds.
Throughout WWII, corporate and personal taxes remained very high.
When the war ended, tax rates were revised. Individual taxes fell slightly
in 1946, reflecting a change in the level of the normal tax from 6% to 3%.
Corporate taxes, on the other hand, fell substantially when the excess profits
tax was eliminated. As a result, the maximum corporate profits tax on
income in excess of $50,000 went down to 38%.
It is clear that, with the changes in tax law and the introduction of fully
taxable U.S. Government securities, any comparison of yields must take tax
status into account. Unlike the earlier period, securities that appeared to
be different, now were. It is impossible, however, to determine what the
effective after tax yields were given that the law changed frequently and
that the data on the composition of ownership is not sufficiently detailed.
The conclusion is that data exist for estimation of a nontaxable term
structure from 1929 to 1940 and a taxable term structure from 1941 to
1949. Unfortunately, any attempt to derive a consistent term structure,
either taxable or tax exempt, for the entire period would require adhoc
adjustmentsto one period or the other.
5 Estimating the Term Structure
To estimate the term structure, it is necessary to fit a curve through the
scatter of points similar to Figure 2 for each month of the sample. There
is a large literature on estimating the term structure of interest rates.34
What is needed here is a technique that provides a sufficiently broad set of
alternative shapes, but is parsimonious in its parameterization. Considering
that the early months have fewer than 15 data points apiece, it is important
to use a method that requires estimation of the fewest parameters possible.
Nelson and Seigel (1985) derive a four parameter model that allows for
humped, monotonic and S-shaped yield curves. Their specification, derived
1941 to the end of 1945 both corporate and individual taxes were confiscatory.
The highest surtax rate for individual rose from 75% in 1940 to 91% in 1945, while the
highest marginal tax rate for corporations exceeded 95%.
34Durand (1942, 1958) and Dura.nd and Winn (1947) pioneered the field by drawing
freehand curves through scatter diagrams. McCulloch (1971) and Shea (1985) provide ex-
aminations of analytical curve fitting techniques which use cubic splines and exponentials.
Brown and Dybvig (1986) estimate yield curves using the model derived by Cox, Ingersoll
and Ross (1985).
19as the solution to a differential equation relating the forward rate to the
time to maturity, is
m[1—e] R(m)=a+b +ce , (4)
where R(m) is the yield to maturity m, and a, b, c and r are parameters.
While Nelson and Seigel apply (4) to data on pure discount securities, here
it is used as an approximation for securities regardless of whether they are
coupon bearing or not.
It would be preferable to use a technique that accounts for the fact
that securities with different coupon rates and the same maturity date are
expected to have different yields. But methods such as those in McCulloch
(1971) or Brown and Dybvig (1986), require large amounts of data. The
errors that are introduced by ignoring the differences in coupon rates are
clearly small relative to the corrections made for the exchange privilege.35
Equation (4) was modified to take into account the tax differences de-
scribed in Section 4. For the 1941 to 1949 period a multiplicative constant
was estimated to allow yields on securities with different tax status to differ
systematically. The following specification was used:
R(m) =(1+ aD + atDt)f(m, 9) , (5)
where
1 if the security is partially tax exempt and 0 otherwise,
=1if the security is fully taxable and 0 otherwise,
f(m, 9) is the Nelson and Seigel function in (4), and the a's are parameters
that measure the difference between either partially tax exempt or fully
taxable securities and nontaxable ones.36
For each month from January 1929 to December 1949, estimation of
equation (5) proceeded as follows. First, because of the inaccuracies in the
35A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that coupon rate differences cause errors on
the order of 0.1 percentage points, while adjustment for the exchange privilege increases
measured yields by amounts in excess of a full percentage point.
36An important problem in more recent yield curve estimation does not arise here.
McCulloch (1975) discusses how, for fully taxable securities selling below par, the differ-
ential tax treatment of the principle appreciation and the coupon payment can produce
misleading results. But for the period under study, bonds sold almost exclusively above
par.
20procedure for valuing the exchange privilege, all coupon securities with less
than six months to maturity were omitted.37
From 1934 to 1945, the Treasury Bill rate was usually below 0.25%. As
such, the yield curves came very close to zero at short maturities. If left
unconstrained, estimates of the yields at three months to maturity were
occasionally negative. The solution is to force the estimates to go exactly
through the Treasury Bill rate at a maturity of three months. The constraint
is imposed by restricting the value of the constant term a in equation (4).
Finally, as suggested by Nelson and Seigel, estimation was conditional
on the parameter i-.Plotsof the data show that the yield curve becomes
flat at longer maturities, suggesting that rshouldnot be in a range above
200, and so a search was done over a grid from 10 to 250 in increments of 10.
The final estimate minimized the sum of squared residuals over this range.38
The results are yield curve estimates for each month. For February 1935,
the fitted values are plotted as the solid line in Figure 2. As can be seen
from the figure, the line fits fairly well for maturities contained in the data
set. In fact, the fitted values account for 90% of the variation in the data
in over 200 of the 252 months. Extrapolation to maturities longer than
existing securities can be misleading, however. The fitted values turn down
at longer maturities, while the scatter plot shows no signs of a downward
slope. This implies that the estimates are likely to be unreliable at maturities
past twenty years, and have only limited accuracy past fifteen years.
The appendix reports estimates of nominal interest rates at maturities
from three months to twenty years, monthly from January 1929 to December
1949. The data are for the last trading day of each month. The full data
set is available from the author on standard diskettes.
3TBoth because of their call provisions and their tax status, the 3.% Treasury Notes
of March, September and December of 1930-32 were also omitted. These notes were fully
taxable and tended to fall on the yield curve when the maturity date was assumed to
be the final redemption date. Since they were actually called during 1930 and 1931, it
was unclear how to differentiate between the value of the call provision and the value of
the coupon payments. In addition, after December 1930, all Liberty Bonds were omitted.
These were issues used to finance the World War I that contained provisions that allowed.
them to be called beginning in 1932. They are the only bonds in the sample that were
not called on the first date allowed.
381t was not possible to estimate rbysimple nonlinear least squares. For a number
of months, the estimate of rgrewtoo large. As rgrows,e goes to zero and c in (4)
cannot be estimated.
216 Concluding Remarks
The mystery of negative nominal interest rates has ben solved. The
legal and economic environment of the 1930s restricted themethod in which
the Treasury issued and refunded coupon bearing securities. The Treasury
was required by law to issue new bonds at par, and to insurethat an offering
sold, coupon rates were set so that initial market prices exceeded par.In
this way individuals and brokers were paid an underwriting fee to place the
new securities. Since holders of maturing securities were given preference
in the distribution of a new issue, the quoted prices reflected the value of
an exchange privilege —theoption to hold the bond or note to maturity
and roll it over into a new security. The increase in the price was large
enough that the yield, computed in the standard way, appeared negative.
Adjustment for this distortion in the price allows recomputationof the yield
to the coupon bearing component of the composite bond/option.
Taking account of the value of the exchange privilege is obviouslyim-
portant. Any comparison of nominal interest rateswith and without the
adjustment shows systematic differences. Figure 3, for example, plotsthe
Federal Reserve Board's series entitled '3- to 5-year tax exempt Treasury
notes', from Banking and Monetary Statistic8 Table 122 against the new es-
timates for tax exempt yields on U.S. Government securities with four years
to maturity. Figure 4 compares the new ten year to maturity estimateswith
the FRB series for 'U.S. Government' bonds.
Both plots show striking differences. As one would expect, the FRB
medium term series is systematically too low, since it fails to account for
the value of the exchange privilege. The new four year estimates are on
average 0.27 percentage points, or 30%, higher.This represents a revision
in the level of not only the nominal interest rate for this period, but an
increase in the estimate of the real interest rate as well.
Differences are also apparent in comparing the old and new series for
longer term yields. This time the FRB series is higherthan the new ten
year series from 1935 through 1940.Over the entire period, the average
level of the FRB series is 0.16 percentage points higher than the ten year
series. In addition, the old series is too stable, with a standard deviation
0.22 percentage points below the new ten year estimates. Examinationof
new series at longer maturities shows that the FRBbond data is close to
the new estimates at fifteen years to maturity.
The usefulness of these new data is without question. Much of the argu-
ment over the casues of the length and depth of the Great Depression turns
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,
 on attempts to interpret movements in interest rates. The new data will
allow detailed study of a type that could not have previously been under-
taken. In particular, they can be used to examine movements in the slope
of the term structure and shifts in the spread between corporate and U.S.
Government bond yields in the crucial period from 1929 to 1933. Hopefully,
this will allow investigators to differentiate among the various theories for
the causes of the most severe economic downturn of the twentieth century.
25Appendix
The following table contains the constant maturity nominal term structure
estimated using the Nelson and Seigel specification described in Section 5. From
1929 to 1940, the estimates are for nominal yields on wholly tax exempt secu-
rities. From 1941 to 1949 the estimates are for nominal yields on fully taxable
securities. All data refer to the last trading day of the month.
TABLE A.1
Constant Maturity Yield Curve, 1929 to 1949
Time to Maturity
Mon1h 3mon lyr2yrSyr4yr5yrlOyr l5yr 2Oyr
Nonazable
1294.724.55 4.37 4.22 4.09 3.993.693.573.51
2294.754.62 4.46 4.32 4.20 4.103.773.663.70
3295.034.89 4.73 4.58 4.45 4.333.923.763.79
4295.094.86 4.59 4.38 4.21 4.073.693.593.58
5295.195.04 4.86 4.70 4.55 4.423.953.733.71
6294.864.76 4.64 4.53 4.42 4.333.943.693.54
7294.944.83 4.69 4.56 4.44 4.333.873.553.35
8294.694.61 4.51 4.42 4.33 4.253.933.723.60
9294.894.80 4.69 4.58 4.48 4.394.003.713.50
10294.004.37 4.47 4.44 4.36 4.283.843.402.96
11293.013.59 3.83 3.87 3.84 3.803.573.343.10
12292.823.43 3.69 3.75 3.74 3.723.573.413.26
26Time to Maturity
Month 3mon lyr2yrSyr yr 5yr lOyr l5yr 2Oyr
1303.843.903.90 3.87 3.84 3.813.643.473.31
2303.043.52 3.713.75 3.74 3.713.553.393.23
3302.713.22 3.453.513.513.503.413.333.24
4302,963.35 3.53 3.57 3.57 3.563.483.403.31
5302.072.94 3.34 3.45 3.46 3.463.363.273.17
6301.782.43 2.93 3.19 3.32 3.383.353.233.11
7301.542.533.013.16 3.203.223.243.253.26
8302.092.49 2.85 3.07 3.213.303.353.253.12
9301.422.36 2.83 2.98 3.03 3.063.143.213.28
10301.762.28 2.70 2.93 3.05 3.12 3.193.193.19
11301.531.97 2.39 2.67 2.85 2.983.223.273.30
12301.251.93 2.48 2.79 2.96 3.05 3.203.243.28
1311.101.59 2.06 2.39 2.63 2.793.183.363.50
2311.501.72 2.00 2.24 2.45 2.64 3.243.383.19
3311.332.012.55 2.85 3.01 3.113.243.283.31
4311.201.87 2.40 2.71 2.88 2.983.163.233.30
5310.651.17 1.70 2.09 2.38 2.603.063.163.17
6310.601.051.53 1.92 2.23 2.473.073.153.06
7310.350.781.28 1.70 2.04 2.323.073.182.98
8310.401.31 2.04 2.45 2.69 2.833.083.193.29
9311.371.67 2.02 2.32 2.57 2.793.403.453.16
10312.502.68 2.90 3.09 3.25 3.403.813.833.56
11312.402.58 2.79 2.98 3.14 3.283.723.783.57
12312.753.80 4.28 4.41 4.43 4.414.284.154.01
1322.303.91 4.64 4.83 4.85 4.824.604.374.14
2322.373.65 4.23 4.38 4.39 4.364.163.953.73
3321.753.35 4.08 4.28 4.314.294.133.953.77
4320.551.76 2.70 3.20 3.47 3.603.673.573.46
5320.251.34 2.35 3.01 3.44 3.714.063.953.78
6320.251.30 2.27 2.90 3.30 3.553.843.693.49
7320.251.42 2.35 2.85 3.13 3.293.463.473.46
8320.201.39 2.33 2.85 3.13 3.283.443.433.42
9320.101.031.90 2.47 2.85 3.093.433.383.28
10320.100.891.69 2.27 2.68 2.973.493.453.29
11320.050.861.68 2.26 2.68 2.973.483.413.22
12320.050.801.55 2.10 2.49 2.773.293.283.15
27Time to Maturity
Month Smon lyr2yr3yr.yr5yrlOyrl5yr lOyr
1330.050.731.431.97 2.37 2.673.263.202.96
2330.631.74 2.62 3.09 3.34 3.473.563.493.42
3331.001.91 2.62 3.01 3.223.333.423.393.34
4330.351.28 2.14 2.70 3.063.283.543.403.22
5330.201.061.85 2.38 2.72 2.953.283.253.17
6330.150.911.67 2.21 2.59 2.863.293.182.95
7330.251.091.87 2.38 2.72 2.943.263.223.14
8330,120.861.60 2.14 2.52 2.783.253.19. 3.01
9330.050.831.61 2.17 2.57 2.853.313.223.01
10330.151.041.87 2.42 2.77 3.003.313.253.13
11330.351.61 2.60 3.12 3.39 3.533.573.433.29
12330.502.26 3.11 3.37 3.45 3.483.523.553.58
1340.602.14 2.89 3.13 3.22 3.263.353.443.53
2340.151.34 2.28 2.79 3.07 3.213.343.293.24
3340.150.901.65 2.18 2.56 2.823.243.132.91
4340.150.801.47 1.95 2.30 2.563.083.123.07
5340.150.67 1.24 1.69 2.06 2.343.002.992.72
6340.150.601.12 1.54 1.90 2.182.912.952.67
7340.150.60 1.12 1.551.91 2.202.942.942.58
8340.200.76 1.36 1.83 2.19 2.473.073.042.78
9340.251.08 1.85 2.37 2.70 2.923.253.233.16
10340.250.90 1.55 2.03 2.37 2.613.073.062.95
11340.250.90 1.55 2.02 2.36 2.603.053.042.92
12340.200.71 1.261.71 2.07 2.352.982.962.68
1350.200.631.121.53 1.87 2.152.842.832.48
2350.150.51 0.941.32 1.64 1.932.732.762.24
3350.150.48 0.87 1.22 1.53 1.802.652.872.67
4350.150.47 0.85 1.19 1.501.772.642.882.66
5350.150.49 0.89 1.23 1.531.792.552.742.59
6350.150.45 0.811.13 1.421.672.512.782.62
7350.150.44 0.79 1.111.391.652.502.802.69
8350.200.55 0.96 1.321.641.912.732.842.48
9350.200.61 1.081.471.79 2.062.772.922.81
10350.200.56 0.981.34 1.651.912.702.902.77
11350.150.52 0.961.33 1.64 1.912.712.902.79
12350.150.48 0.871.22 1.52 1.792.652.892.74
28Time to Maturity
Month 3mon lyr2yrSyr$yr5yr lOyr l5yr 2Cyr
1360.200.520.90 1.23 1.53 1.792.632.882.72
2360.200.490.83 1.15 1.43 1.672.512.812.71
3360.200.48 0.821.13 1.401.642.462.742.65
4360.200.48 0.821.12 1.391.632.452.732.62
5360.200.49 0.831.13 1.401.642.402.672.63
6360.150.48 0.861.191.461.702.402.672.73
7360.150.49 0.881.201.481.702.382.642.73
8360.200.50 0.841.14 1.401.622.312.582.66
9360.180.51 0.891.201.461.682.312.582.71
10360.100.50 0.931.26 1.521.722.282.562.76
11360.110.44 0.801.081.311.502.082.412.69
12360.200.661.061.331.511.64 2.062.402.74
1370.220.731.171.451.631.762.142.432.72
2370.250.781.231.511.691.812.162.422.67
3370.601.161.641.93 2.11 2.24 2.562.803.03
4370.601.071.521.84 2.06 2.232.622.802.96
5370.451.201.631.811.92 2.012.392.773.15
6370.391.261.731.92 2.03 2.112.462.803.14
7370.321.141.601.791.891.982.342.693.05
8370.421.331.82 2.01 2.11 2.182.492.793.08
9370.251.151.641.851.96 2.052.432.803.17
10370.231.111.591.801.92 2.012.402.803.19
11370.121.031.531.741.861.952.342.733.12
12370.120.921.371.581.711.812.272.723.17
1380.140.90 1.341.541.661.762.222.673.12
2380.120.82 1.231.431.571.672.172.673.16
3380.120.88 1.321.531.66 1.772.262.753.24
4380.080.67 1.05 1.24 1.38 1.502.052.593.14
5380.080.37 0.710.991.24 1.452.132.502.75
6380.080.310.60 0.87 1.11 1.332.122.522.63
7380.080.35 0.67 0.951.18 1.392.082.452.68
8380.080.610.96 1.14 1.28 1.391.942.493.03
9380.120,41 0.74 1.02 1.26 1.462.132.482.71
10380.050.32 0.63 0.911.14 1.352.062.432.64
11380.050.32 0.64 0.92 1.16 1.382.112.482.68
12380.050.28 0.560.811.04 1.262.042.452.59
29Time to Maturity
Month Smon lyr2yr3yr.ç(yr5yr lOyr l5yr Oyr
1390.010.24 0.52 0.78 1.01 1.222.012.422.56
2390.050.26 0.510.75 0.961.161.922.352.55
3390.050.24 0.48 0.69 0.901.081.812.262.50
4390.050.23 0.46 0.67 0.871.051.762.202.44
5390.050.21 0.42 0.61 0.79 0.951.622.052.32
4390.050.42 0.68 0.84 0.95 1.061.552.042.54
7390.050.40 0.65 0.79 0.911.011.491.962.44
8390.100.64 0.96 1.12 1.23 1.321.732.142.55
9390.100.49 0.90 1.23 1.48 1.692.272.582.81
10390.050.29 0.58 0.84 1.07 1.282.002.382.56
11390.050.25 0.50 0.72 0.931.131.852.272.45
12390.050.22 0.43 0.63 0.82 0.991.702.182.49
1400.050.22 0.44 0.65 0.84 1.011.732.212.51
2400.050.22 0.43 0.63 0.82 0.991.712.212.54
3400.050.20 0.39 0.57 0.74 0.901.572.072.43
4400.050.20 0.40 0.59 0.76 0.921.602.102.45
5400.080.65 1.00 1.17 1.29 1.401.872.342.82
6400.080.43 0.69 0.85 0.971.081.622.152.68
7400.060.43 0.69 0.85 0.971.081.612.132.65
8400.060.23 0.44 0.63 0.82 0.991.692.172.49
9400.060.21 0.40 0.58 0.75 0.921.592.102.46
10400.060.20 0.380.55. 0.710.861.532.072.49
11400.060.16 0.30 0.44 0.58 0.721.371.942.46
12400.060.16 0.31 0.45 0.58 0.721.351.902.39
30Time to Maturity
Month Smon lyr2yrSyr 4yr5yr1Ojr l5yr 2Oyr
Taxable
1410.090.26 0.480.69 0.88 1.061.822.362.73
2410.080.24 0.44 0.62 0.790.951.561.932.13
3410.150.34 0.57 0.78 0.981.171.892.352.60
4410.130.31 0.53 0.74 0.941.121.862.382.71
5410.130.31 0.54 0.75 0.941.131.872.382.70
6410.130.29 0.50 0.69 0.881.051.762.262.60
7410.130.28 0.47 0.65 0.82 0.991.672.172.54
8410.130.29 0.49 0.69 0.861.031.722.212.54
9410.130.30 0.51 0.71 0.901.071.752.192.46
10410.130.32 0.56 0.77 0.961.131.742.072.25
11410.350.50 0.69 0.861.021.161.732.082.27
12410.350.57 0.82 1.031.221.371.892.172.36
1420.250.48 0.76 1.001.211.391.992.282.40
2420.300.53 0.801.041.251.442.062.352.45
3420.300.510.76 0.991.191.372.002.322.43
4420.350.57 0.83 1.071.271.452.062.352.46
5420.380.610.88 1.111.311.482.032.282.40
6420.340.60 0.90 1.14 1.341.522.042.272.40
7420.350.620.93 1.191.401.582.102.332.44
8420.350.630.94 1.20 1.411.592.122.342.44
9420.350.65 0.98 1.24 1.461.632.122.342.46
10420.350.63 0.94 1.20 1.42 1.602.132.352.46
11420.350.64 0.96 1.23 1.45 1.632.162.382.49
12420.320.63 0.97 1.24 1.46 1.632.142.352.47
1430.320.59 0.891.15 1.37 1.552.122.362.46
2430.320.59 0.901.16 1.38 1.572.132.372.47
3430.350.64 0.971.23 1.44 1.622.112.342.47
4430.350.65 0.981.24 1.45 1.632.122.332.45
5430.350.63 0.941.191.401.572.062.282.43
6430.350.61 0.901.151.361.532.062.302.44
7430.350.61 0.91 1.161.37 1.552.082.322.45
8430.350.63 0.95 1.211.411.582.082.312.46
9430.350.66 0.98 1.241.441.602.052.282.45
10430.350.66 1.00 1.261.461.622.072.302.47
11430.350.63 0.95 1.221.441.622.162.382.49
12430.350.65 0.97 1.23 1.451.622.122.352.48
31Time to Maturity
Month .9mon lyr2yrSyr.4yr5yr lOyr 15yr Oyr
1440.320.65 0.99 1.26 1.47 1.642.102.322.49
2440.320.64 0.99 1.25 1.46 1.632.092.322.48
3440.350.64 0.97 1.23 1.44 1.612.122.352.49
4440.350.62 0.93 1.19 1.40 1.592.152.402.50
5440.350.62 0.93 1.20 1.42 1.602.172.402.50
6440.350.65 0.98 1.24 1.46 1.632.142.362.50
7440.350.63 0.95 1.211.431.612.152.382.50
8440.350.61 0.911.17 1.391.572.162.402.49
9440.350.62 0.931.191.411.602.162.392.49
10440.350.65 0.981.24 1.461.632.142.362.50
11440.350.671.021.28 1.491.652.112.332.50
12440.350.671.021.28 1.491.652.112.322.48
1450.350.60 0.901.14 1.35 1.532.072.312.42
2450.350.61 0.90 1.13 1,33 1.491.982.232.40
3450.350.61 0.89 1.13 1.32 1.481.982.242.41
4450.350.61 0.89 1.10 1.26 1.401.832.132.41
5450.350.811.09 1.22 1.32 1.391.752.102.45
6450.350.781.05 1.18 1.27 1.351.702.052.41
7450.350.811.08 1.22 1.31 1.381.732.072.41
8450.350.82 1.10 1.24 1.331.401.742.082.41
9450.350.811.09 1.22 1.31 1.391.732.072.42
10450.350.79 1.06 1.191.28 1.351.702.042.38
11450.350.77 1.02 1.15 1.241.321.662.012.36
12450.350.74 0.991.121.201.281.631.982.32
1460.350.69 0.911.031.111.191.531.872.22
2460.350.65 0.85 0.961.051.121.471.822.16
3460.350.71 0.931.04 1.12 1.191.501.812.12
4460.350.791.051.18 1.26 1.321.631.922.22
5460.350.80 1.06 1.18 1.27 1.331.641.942.24
6460.350.75 1.00 1.12 1.211.281.601.912.23
7460.350.78 1.04 1.17 1.25 1.321.651.972.30
8460.350.811,09 1.221.301.371.692.012.33
9460.350.86 1.161.291.381.441.752.062.37
10460.350.85 1.131.271.351.421.722.032.33
11460.350.901.211.351.43 1.501.792.082.37
12460.350.861.151.28 1.36 1.431.722.022.31
32Time to Maturity
Month Smon lyr2yrSyr yr 5yrlOyrl5yr 2Oyr
1470.350.841.121.251.331.401.712.012.31
2470.350.84 1.121.25 1.341.401.702.002.30
3470.350.811.09 1.211.30 1.371.681.992.30
4470.350.86 1.151.28 1.37 1.431.722.012.30
5470.350.861.151.281.361.431.722.012.9
6470.350.871.171.311.391.461.762.052.35
7470.701.001.201.301.381.441.752.052.36
8470.730.98 1.15 1.251.331.401.712.032.34
9470.781.02 1.18 1.28 1.35 1.421.742.052.37
10470.851.13 1.311.41 1.49 1.551.852.142.44
11470.911.12 1.32 1.46 1.57 1.651.962.222.49
12470.921.101.301.48 1.64 1.772.202.402.47
1480.941.11 1.311.491.641.772.202.402.48
2480.961.12 1.30 1.47 1.621.752.192.402.47
3480.991.14 1.311.47 1.61 1.732.162.382.48
4480.961.121.311.47 1.61 1.732.142.362.50
5480.961.081.231.37 1.49 1.612.052.312.44
6480.971.131.321.481.62 1.742.152.372.50
7480.961.141.341.511.661.792.202.392.50
8481.041.201.391.551.701.822.222.412.48
9481.081.24 1.431.591.73 1.852.232.412.49
10481.081.27 1.471.64 1.78 1.892.232.402.51
11481.081.24 1.43 1.59 1.72 1.832.202.392.51
12481.101.23 1.39 1.53 1.65 1.762.162.382.48
1491.111.221.361.49 1.60 1.712.122.352.46
2491.111.221.361.49 1.60 1.712.112.332.43
3491.111.211.341.46 1.57 1.672.072.312.45
4491.101.201.331.44 1.551.652.062.322.47
5491.101.191.311.431.531.632.032.312.50
6491.021.111.221.331.431.531.932.232.45
7490.981.07 1.181.291.391.491.902.202.42
8491.011.07 1.161.251.331.421.812.152.45
9491.001.08 1.181.281.371.461.842.152.39
10491.021.10 1.20 1.291.381.471.852.152.38
11491.061.13 1.22 1.311.401.481.842.142.38
12491.051.111.19 1.271.35 1.431.792.112.39
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